Como nomeamos as coisas? A semântica dos nomes próprios e descrições definidas de Frege e Russell

Abstract

In this work, we will try to highlight theories about the semantics of the firt names ande descriptions of. This will occur from the analysis of different conceptions about the theme, whose theorists analyzed are Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Names are used daily by individuals to name things in the wolrd, often autmatically; but ir really starts to be a philosophical probelm quen we ask ourselves and try to find solutions to explain how this relation takes place and what its nature is. It is necessary to distinguish the names, among the other existing linguistic categories, since they have particular aspects as linguistic expressions. Thus, firstly, Frege’s semantic conception of proper names and definite descriptions will be exposed, pointin out the way in wich the idea that names are endowed with meaning, because, for Frege, there are three planes that make up linguistic expressions: there is the plane names (sings), objects (references) ande senses. Then, criticisms of the Fregean theori will be addressed from Russell’s understanding of the meaning of proper names and definite descriptions, explaining the Russellian semantic conception, in wich ordinary proper names are, in fact, abbreviated/ disguise definite description, showing that, unlike Frege, Russell, in addition to saying what is or is not liked to a name, tries to say how in the use of the name it is possible to print directly to the named object.