Medidas Provisórias: uma análise da utilização do instrumento no Brasil

Abstract

The following monograph consists of a study and analysis about the use of Provisional Measures in Brazil and whether the use of such instrument is abusive and harmful to the government system in Brazil. The method used during the composition of the work was the hypothetical-deductive, by the use of bibliographical analysis, study of legislation, and also data survey to guarantee a wider vision about the subject. In this work, we first study the Provisional Measures themselves, focusing on their definition and legal nature, their historical roots, the constituent debates at the time of their creation, their legislative evolution, the implementation of Constitutional Amendment 32/01 and the changes caused by it, and the requirements of urgency and relevance. The study then turns to the Separation of Powers Theory, Modern and Contemporary Constitutionalism, Coalition Presidentialism, and the institutional design of the Three Powers in Brazil. Always focusing on the analysis of Provisional Measures and their use in Brazil. Afterwards, an analysis of the use of Provisional Measures in Brazil will be demonstrated, here already performing a quantitative study focused on investigating the quantity of Provisional Measures throughout the years after the promulgation of Constitutional Amendment 32/01, it will also be demonstrated some interventions of the Judiciary Power regarding Provisional Measures, some cases on moments when the return of Provisional Measures by the Legislative to the Executive occurred, the deep connection that exists between this instrument and the Coalition Presidentialism, and finally the Institutional Mutualism existing in the Brazilian government model will be approached. It is noteworthy that due to the mutations that have occurred over time with the country and with the institution of Provisional Measures, it is necessary to carry out the thesis to investigate whether this instrument has a space in our legal system without creating democratic ruptures.